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h i g h l i g h t s
• We consider Thomson and Lensberg’s (1989) characterization of the Leximin bargaining solution.
• We remove Pareto Optimality from their axiom set.
• The remaining axioms characterize a class of Truncated Leximin solutions.
• These truncate agents’ Leximin solution payoffs at a given utility level α.
• We discuss efficiency-free characterizations of the Leximin solution.
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a b s t r a c t
This paper shows that three classic properties for bargaining solutions in an environment with a variable
number of agents – Anonymity (AN), Individual Monotonicity (IM), and Consistency (CONS) – characterize
a one-parameter family of Truncated Leximin solutions. Given a non-negative and possibly infinite α, an
α-Truncated Leximin solution gives each agent the minimum of α and their Leximin solution payoff.
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Real-life conflict situations inwhich the parties involved cannot
appeal to an outside arbitrator, are often resolved non-optimally,
for instance due to delay in reaching an agreement, or because
agents do not know each other’s utilities. The consequence for the
axiomatic treatment of bargaining solutions, a literature initiated
by Nash (1950), is that it may not always be appropriate to im-
pose the axiom Pareto Optimality on proposed solutions. For solu-
tions whose characterizations do involve Pareto Optimality, it is
thus of interest to examinewhat kind of violations of efficiency oc-
cur when this property is dropped from the corresponding axiom
set. If much freedom is gained, it may be taken as an indication
of the importance of Pareto Optimality in the composition of the
studied solution, and thus, in absence of any other efficiency-free
characterizations, that the solutionmay not be appropriate in envi-
ronments where such optimality is not guaranteed. Conversely, if
only few implausible solutions emerge, it means that the solution
is robust against violations of efficiency.
This paper examines Thomson and Lensberg’s (1989) character-
ization of the Leximin solution (Imai, 1983; Chun and Peters, 1989;
Nieto, 1992; Chen, 2000), which aside from Pareto Optimality in-
volves the three properties IndividualMonotonicity,Anonymity, and
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4.0/).Consistency. In any bargaining problem, the Leximin solution picks
the unique outcome that is obtained by iteratively maximizing the
payoffs of the worst-off agents, then those of the second worst-off,
and so on, until no agent’s utility can be further increased within
the feasible set. In so doing, it embodies two different principles
of distributive justice: Pareto Optimality on the one hand, and on
the other Rawls’s (1971) proposition that inequalities between in-
dividuals should only be allowed if they work towards the benefit
of those that are less advantaged (i.e., the Difference Principle).
The main result of the paper is that dropping Pareto Optimality
from Thomson and Lensberg’s axiom set gives rise to a family of
Truncated Leximin solutions: each member of this family truncates
agents’ Leximin solution payoffs at a given utility level. It can be
argued that this is a large class of bargaining solutions. Hence,
in view of Thomson and Lensberg’s (1989) axiomatization, the
exercise in this paper puts into question the appropriateness of
the Leximin solution in non-arbitrated settings where efficiency is
doubtful. On the positive side, an efficiency-free characterization
of the Leximin solution follows as a simple corollary from our
main result. Furthermore, the inefficient solutions that emerge
from Thomson and Lensberg’s axioms minus Pareto Optimality,
continue to uphold Rawls’s conception of egalitarianism: if the
best-off agents achieve utility levelα, then anα-Truncated Leximin
solution yields the ‘‘most just’’ feasible distribution of income
under this constraint, in the same way the Leximin solution does
in general.
icle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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1984). That paper considers Thomson’s (1983) axiomatization
of the Egalitarian solution, and shows that when there are at
least three bargainers, the only additional solutions that become
admissible when Weak Pareto Optimality is removed from the
axiom set, are Truncated Egalitarian solutions.1 While similar to
those considered in this paper, Thomson’s solutions are different
in two significant ways. Most obviously, Truncated Egalitarian
solutions truncate the Egalitarian solution outcome rather than
the Leximin solution outcome. While the Egalitarian and Leximin
solutions coincide on the domain of strictly comprehensive
problems, this is not generally the case. Secondly, the utility level
at which Truncated Egalitarian solutions truncate the solution
outcome may depend on (the size of) the coalition of bargaining
agents, while for Truncated Leximin solutions the cut-off point is
independent of the problem.
Other literature related to this paper deals with the Nash
bargaining solution (Nash, 1950), and characterizations thereof.
Roth (1977) provided a characterization that does not rely on
Pareto Optimality, by removing that property from Nash’s axiom
set, and replacing it by Strong Individual Rationality. He further
demonstrated that without Pareto Optimality, the only additional
solution that becomes admissible is the Disagreement solution
(Roth, 1979a). Lensberg (1988) characterized the Nash solution
by replacing Nash’s independence axiom by Consistency. Lensberg
and Thomson (1988) subsequently proved a result similar to
Roth’s (1979a): by removing Pareto Optimality from Lensberg’s
axiom set, only the Disagreement solution becomes admissible.
Adding Strong Individual Rationality rules out the Disagreement
solution, so Lensberg and Thomson’s result too gives rise to
a characterization of the Nash solution that does not rely on
Pareto Optimality. For the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (Kalai and
Smorodinsky, 1975), a number of efficiency-free characterizations
have recently been obtained by Rachmilevitch (2014).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the
framework and all relevant definitions. In Section 3 we prove our
main result, and Section 4 discusses its relation to other results in
the literature. Section 5 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. The bargaining problem
There is an infinite population I of agents, indexed by the pos-
itive integers. The set of all finite subsets of I is denoted P . Given
P ∈ P , RP+ denotes the Cartesian product of |P| copies of R+, in-
dexed by the elements of P . For x, y ∈ RP+, x > y means x − y ∈
RP++, x = ymeans x−y ∈ RP+, and x ≥ ymeans x = y and x ≠ y. The
setΣP contains all sets S ⊆ RP+ that are compact, convex and com-
prehensive,2 and that further contain at least one vector z with z >
0 ≡ (0, . . . , 0). An element S of ΣP is a problem for P . The set S
represents the utilities agents in P can realize by cooperation; fail-
ure to cooperate leads to the unfavorable disagreement outcome
0 ∈ RP+. The setΣ ≡

P∈P ΣP contains all problems. A solution is
amapϕ defined onΣ , that associates for all P ∈ P , andwith all S ∈
ΣP , a unique ϕ(S) ∈ S. The solution outcome ϕ(S) represents the
compromise the agents in P reach when faced with the problem S.
Bargaining problems and solutions can be given a normative or
a descriptive interpretation. Under the normative interpretation,
1 For two-person problems there exist other solutions satisfying Thomson’s
(1984) axioms. This issue does not occur in our result, a matter that is addressed
in Section 4.1.
2 For all x, y ∈ RP+ , if x ∈ S and y 5 x then y ∈ S.a bargaining problem is the representation of an arbitrated
dispute: rather than engaging in negotiations with one another,
the agents turn to an impartial outsider to settle the dispute
for them; a solution is accordingly interpreted as an arbitration
scheme, i.e. a rule by which this arbiter generally adjudicates
the conflicts he is presented with. In this paper, we adopt the
contrasting descriptive point of view: a bargaining problem is
thus considered to be the representation of actual negotiations
between rational, intelligent, and self-serving economic agents;
accordingly, a solution summarizes all strategic interactions that
lead those agents to an unanimous agreement.
Given our descriptive interpretation of the problem, the natural
next question is how the utilities over which the agents negotiate
are to be interpreted. Nash (1950) contended that in strategic
settings comparisons of utility across agents are meaningless, and
can thus not play a role in the negotiations. However, it is arguable
that in many instances, the resolution of a conflict does in fact –
at least in part – rely on such comparisons. Suppose for instance
that two agents bargain by first staking out initial positions that
are irreconcilable, and then find compromise by gradually making
mutual concessions with respect to these initial claims; in such
situations it is not inconceivable that the concessions the one agent
makes depend on his perceived value of the concessions made
by the other. The assumption of interpersonal utility comparisons
also has empirical support: Nydegger and Owen (1974) tested
Nash’s (1950) axioms experimentally, and found that subjects
did in fact compare utilities. The assumption that utilities are
cardinally measurable and comparable across agents thus seems
to be defensible in a descriptive theory of bargaining, and will
henceforth be made without further qualifications.3
2.2. Further definitions and notation
Next, several definitions and notations are introduced.
An interval is defined as a non-empty connected subset of R+.
Consider an interval A. If there are a, b ∈ R+∪{∞} such that for all
x ∈ R+, x ∈ A if and only if a < x < b, then A is an open interval,
and denoted by (a, b). Similarly, if there are a, b ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} such
that for all x ∈ R+, x ∈ A if and only if a 5 x 5 b, then A is a closed
interval, and denoted by [a, b]. Half-open intervals are similarly
defined, and respectively denoted by [a, b) and (a, b]. An interval
A is non-degenerate if there exist x, y ∈ A such that x > y. Given a
non-degenerate interval A, the function f : R+ → R+ is said to be
non-decreasing on A if for all x, y ∈ A, x > y implies f (x) = f (y); f
is said to be increasingonA if x > y implies f (x) > f (y).Whenever
A = R+, the part ‘‘on A’’ is omitted—i.e. f is then respectively said
to be ‘‘non-decreasing’’ or ‘‘increasing’’.
For P ∈ P and S ∈ ΣP , theutopia point is defined as a(S) ∈ RP+
with ai(S) ≡ max{xi | x ∈ S} for all i ∈ P . The Pareto optimal set
and theWeak Pareto optimal set of S are respectively defined as
PO(S) ≡ {x ∈ S | y ≥ x implies y ∉ S} andWPO(S) ≡ {x ∈ S | y >
x implies y ∉ S}. The convex comprehensive hull of S, denoted
cch S, is defined as the smallest convex and comprehensive set in
RP+ that contains S.
For P ∈ P , let ΛP be the family of functions λˆ : RP+ → RP+
defined as follows: for each i ∈ P there exists a strictly positive
λi such that for all x ∈ RP+, λˆ(x) = (λixi)i∈P . For S ∈ ΣP , define
λˆ(S) ≡ {λˆ(x) | x ∈ S}, and note that λˆ(S) ∈ ΣP . If there is a strictly
positive constant λ such that for all i ∈ P and x ∈ RP+, λˆi(x) = λxi,
we write λˆ(x) and λˆ(S) respectively as λx and λS. For P ∈ P , let
3 For further discussion of this assumption, see Luce and Raiffa (1957,
p. 131–132), Shapley (1969), and Kalai (1977).
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that x = λeP for some λ ∈ R++ is said to lie in the egalitarian
direction.
For P, P ′ ∈ P with |P| = |P ′|, let Γ P,P ′ be the family of one-
to-one functions from P to P ′ (note that when P = P ′, this reduces
to the set containing all permutations of P). With a slight abuse
of notation, functions γ ∈ Γ P,P ′ can be treated as functions from
RP to RP
′
: for x ∈ RP , γ (x) is defined as the vector y in RP ′ with
yγ (i) ≡ xi for all i ∈ P . For S ∈ ΣP , γ (S) ≡ {γ (z) | z ∈ S}.
For P,Q ∈ P with P ( Q , let Q \P be the set inP that contains
all the agents in Q that are not in P . If P = {i} with i ∈ I , then we
writeQ \ i rather thanQ \{i}. Given y ∈ RQ+, let yP be the projection
of y onto RP+, and for S ⊆ RQ+, define SP ≡ {yP | y ∈ S}. Finally,
for x ∈ S, define txP(S) as the intersection of S and a hyperplane
through x and parallel to RP , i.e. txP(S) ≡ {y ∈ RP+ | (y, xQ\P) ∈ S}.
2.3. Axioms
This section discusses a number of axioms for bargaining
solutions. The fact that solutions summarize the entire strategic
exchange between the bargainers has implications for whether
an axiom is appropriate or not. Thus, the properties are given
some further context with this interpretation in mind. To avoid
repetition, the phrase ‘‘For all P ∈ P , for all S ∈ ΣP ’’ is omitted.
The first axiom reflects the idea that no agent agrees to an out-
come that does notmake him strictly better off than disagreement.
Strong Individual Rationality (SIR): ϕ(S) > 0.
As argued in the introduction, the outcome of negotiations may
well be Pareto dominated. The following two axioms are normative
in nature, and rule out any such inefficiencies. In particular, the first
says that there is no feasible outcome that makes all agents strictly
better off than the solution outcome; the second says that there are
no feasible outcomes that make any agent strictly better off.
Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO): ϕ(S) ∈ WPO(S).
Pareto Optimality (PO): ϕ(S) ∈ PO(S).
Suppose that two same-sized groups of agents are facing
bargaining problems that are represented by the same geometrical
object. If all relevant information pertaining to the conflict is
contained in the geometry of the feasible set, then these two
groups resolve their conflict in the same way. This intuition is
contained in the following axiom.
Anonymity (AN): For all P ′ ∈ P with |P| = |P ′|, for all σ ∈ Γ P,P ′ ,
ϕ(σ(S)) = σ(ϕ(S)).
If all information on the underlying conflict is contained in the
geometry of the problem, and this problem is further symmetric,
then no rational agent will agree to an outcome that gives him less
than his opponent(s); hence, in such case, the solution outcome is
symmetric as well.
Symmetry (SY): If for all σ ∈ Γ P,P , S = σ(S), then for all i, j ∈ P ,
ϕi(S) = ϕj(S).
Note that SY is implied by AN: if S = σ(S) for all permutations
σ ∈ Γ P,P , then by AN, ϕ(S) = σ(ϕ(S)) for all σ ∈ Γ P,P . Since
for x ∈ RP+, x = σ(x) for all permutations σ ∈ Γ P,P if and only if
xi = xj for all i, j ∈ P , SY follows.
The utilities over which the agents bargain may be interpreted
as vNM utilities: any positive linear transformation of an agent’s
utility function then represents the same preferences on the part
of that agent, and accordingly, any positive linear transformation
of the bargaining problem represents the same conflict. A rescalingof the problem must then result in a rescaling of the solution
outcome. This idea is reflected by the following axiom.4
Scale Invariance (SI): For all λˆ ∈ ΛP , λˆ(ϕ(S)) = ϕ(λˆ(S)).
Suppose that agents discount utilities exponentially with factor
δ ∈ (0, 1) and that S ∈ Σ is attainable at time t + 1. Then there
is no difference between bargaining at time t over the utilities
feasible at time t + 1 (i.e., ϕ(δS)) and bargaining at time t + 1
and discounting back the obtained payoffs (i.e., δϕ(S)). This type
of time-consistence is reflected by a weakening of SI that imposes
the same invariance, but only when all agents’ utility functions are
rescaled using the same positive linear transformation.
Homogeneity (HOM): For all λ ∈ R++, ϕ(λS) = λϕ(S).
Nash (1950) introduced an axiomwhich says that if agents find
agreement on some feasible outcome y, and after a contraction of
the feasible set this outcome remains available, then negotiations
in this smaller problem also lead to unanimous agreement on y.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): For all S ′ ∈ ΣP ,
if ϕ(S) ∈ S ′ ⊆ S then ϕ(S ′) = ϕ(S).
While IIA is normatively appealing, as a descriptive axiom it
has been the subject of much criticism. In particular, Luce and
Raiffa (1957) argued that it renders the solution outcome too
unresponsive to changes in the geometry of the feasible set: if
in the two-person problem T ≡ cch{e1, e2} negotiations lead
to (1/2, 1/2), then IIA dictates that in S ≡ {e1, (1/2, 1/2)}
the solution outcome remains (1/2, 1/2), even though the ability
of agents to demand higher payoffs has been asymmetrically
curtailed. This criticism led Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) to
propose an alternative property. Let P ∈ P , i ∈ P , and S, S ′ ⊆ ΣP ,
and suppose that for any set of demandsmade by the agents in P \i,
agent i can feasibly claim a higher payoff in S ′ than in S. Then if i is
rational, he will not agree to an outcome in S ′ that gives him less
than the outcome that is unanimously accepted in S.
Individual Monotonicity (IM): For all S ′ ∈ ΣP , for all i ∈ P , if
S ⊆ S ′ and SP\i = S ′P\i, then ϕi(S) 5 ϕi(S ′).
Note that Kalai and Smorodinsky only formulated IM for two-
agent problems. While several multilateral generalizations exist
in the literature (Thomson, 1980; Imai, 1983; Chen, 2000), the
present version is due to Kalai (1977).
The following is a normative axiom that says that small changes
in the description of the problem should not lead to radical changes
in the solution outcome.
Continuity (CONT): For all sequences {Sk} ⊆ ΣP converging to S
(in the Hausdorff topology), ϕ(Sk)→ ϕ(S).
Suppose that the agents in Q ∈ P face the problem T ∈ ΣQ ,
and that the proposal y ∈ T has beenput on the table. If an agent i ∈
Q is rational, and he has reason to believe that he could favorably
renegotiate this outcome with a subgroup of agents – i.e. a set of
agents P ∈ P with i ∈ P and P ( Q – then i would not deem y an
acceptable compromise in T , and reject it accordingly. A necessary
condition for an outcome y ∈ T to be the solution outcome is
then that no agent has an incentive to reject it on the basis of such
reasoning. This is the underlying intuition of the following axiom.
Consistency (CONS): For all Q ∈ P with P ( Q , for all T ∈ ΣQ , if
S = tyP (T )with y = ϕ(T ), then ϕ(S) = yP .
4 Note that in this paper, interpersonal comparisons of utility are allowed. See the
above discussion.
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Note that Consistency was first introduced by Harsanyi (1959).
The above formulation is due to Lensberg (1988).5
Consider again a situation in which a group of agents Q ∈ P ,
when confronted with the problem T ∈ ΣQ , can find unanimous
agreement on the outcome x = ϕ(T ). However, prior to reaching
this compromise, some of the agents – say, P ( Q with P ∈ P –
are, for whatever reason, prepared to relinquish all their claims to
utility, and to leave the negotiations empty-handed. Then in this
new situation, no rational agent i ∈ Q \ P would be prepared to
accept an outcome that gives him less than xi. Thomson (1983)
introduced an axiom that reflects precisely this idea.
Population monotonicity (MON): For all Q ∈ P with P ( Q , for
all T ∈ ΣQ , if S = TP , then ϕ(S) = ϕP(T ).
2.4. The Leximin solution
In order to define the Leximin solution, it is useful to first
introduce the lexicographic maximin (in short, leximin) ordering
from which it derives its name. The leximin ordering is a
lexicographic extension of themaximin ordering:when comparing
two outcomes x and y, it ranks highest the outcome that gives the
worst-off agent the highest utility. If x and y are indistinguishable
in terms of how they treat the worst-off, then it ranks highest the
outcome that gives the second worst-off agent the highest utility.
And so on. Note that this reflects the idea of Rawls (1971) that the
worth of an allocation depends on its treatment of the less well-off
(i.e. the Difference Principle). The Leximin solution embodies this
principle in that it chooses from any problem S ∈ Σ the unique
outcome that is maximal with respect to the leximin ordering.
Given P ∈ P and x ∈ RP+, let P ≡ {1, . . . , |P|}, and define
x ≡ µ(x), where µ ∈ Γ P,P is a relabeling of the agents that puts
the entries of x in ascending order, i.e., x1 5 · · · 5 x|P|. Then the
leximin ordering, denoted ≽lP , is the ordering of RP+ such that for
all x, y ∈ RP+, x≻lP y iff either x1 > y1, or there is an i ∈ P such that
xi > yi and xj = yj for all j = 1, . . . , i − 1; and x∼lP y iff x = y.
The family of all orderings ≽lP , where P ∈ P , is denoted ≽l. Given
S ∈ ΣP , the Leximin solution is defined as the unique maximizer
in S w.r.t.≽lP , i.e., L(S) ≡ {x ∈ S | x≽lP y for all y ∈ S}.
Given P ∈ P and S ∈ ΣP , the Leximin solution L(S) can be
obtained through a specific iterative procedure. First let x1 be the
point in S that is obtained bymaximally increasing agents’ utilities
in the egalitarian direction. That is, x1 ≡ α1eP , and α1 ≡ max{α |
αeP ∈ S}. There is a number of agents whose utilities could further
be increased within the feasible set. Let P1 be the set of those
5 Lensberg (1988) referred to this property asMultilateral Stability.agents, that is, P1 ≡ {i ∈ P | ∃x ∈ S s.t. x = x1 and xi > x1i }. Fixing
the utilities of agents in P \ P1 at their x1-levels, we may continue
increasing those of agents in P1 in the egalitarian direction, until
again a point – say x2 – is reached in the boundary, now of tx
1
P1(S).
More precisely, x2
P\P1 ≡ x1P\P1 , and x2P1 ≡ x1P1 + (α2 − α1)eP1 ,
where α2 ≡ max{α | x1P1 + (α − α1)eP1 ∈ tx
1
P1(S)}. The set
P2 contains all the agents in P1 whose utilities could feasibly be
increased beyond their x2-levels, i.e., P2 ≡ {i ∈ P | ∃x ∈ S s.t. x =
x2 and xi > x2i }. In general, at the kth iteration of this procedure,
we set xkP\Pk−1 ≡ xk−1P\Pk−1 , and xkPk−1 ≡ xk−1Pk−1 + (αk − αk−1)ePk−1 ,
where αk ≡ max{α | xk−1
Pk−1 + (α − αk−1)ePk−1 ∈ tx
k−1
Pk−1(S)} and
Pk ≡ {i ∈ P | ∃x ∈ S s.t. x = xk and xi > xk−1i }. Since Pk ( Pk−1
for all k, and since P is finite, there is an iteration k∗ at which Pk∗ is
empty, and the procedure terminates. The Leximin solution L(S) is
given by xk
∗
, the point reached at this stage (see Fig. 1).
The Leximin solution is characterized as follows.
Proposition 2.1 (Thomson and Lensberg, 1989). A solution satisfies
PO, IM, AN, and CONS if and only if it is the Leximin solution.
2.5. Truncated Leximin solutions
We will be concerned with truncated versions of the Leximin
solution. Given P ∈ P , x ∈ RP+, and a non-negative, possibly
infiniteα, define x∧α as the vector y ∈ RP+with yi ≡ min{α, xi} for
all i ∈ P . For S ∈ ΣP , an α-Truncated Leximin solution is defined
by Lα(S) ≡ L(S) ∧ α. The class T contains all Truncated Leximin
solutions—i.e., T ≡ {Lα | α non-negative and possibly infinite}.
For α = ∞ and for α = 0, Lα respectively coincides with L
and with the Disagreement solution—i.e., the solution D that for
all P ∈ P and all S ∈ ΣP yields D(S) = 0. While the exact
value differs from one problem to another, it is clear that there is
always a strictly positive and finite α such that Lα coincides with
the Egalitarian solution. More generally, for finite α > 0, Lα is
equivalently defined as the Leximin solution in the α-truncated
version of the considered problem (see Fig. 2). For S ⊆ RP+, define
S ∧ α ≡ {x ∧ α | x ∈ S}, and note that if S ∈ ΣP and α is strictly
positive and finite, then S ∧ α is a well-defined problem inΣP .
Observation 2.2. For all P ∈ P , for all S ∈ ΣP , and for all finite
α > 0, Lα(S) = L(S ∧ α).
Proof. Let P ∈ P and S, T ∈ ΣP with T ≡ S ∧ α for some finite
α > 0 be given. Let x ≡ Lα(S), y ≡ L(T ) and z ≡ L(S). Since
T ⊆ S, it follows by the definition of L that z≽lP y. Furthermore,
since x = L(S) ∧ α and L(S) ∈ S, x ∈ T ; then by the definition of L,
y≽lP x. Hence, by transitivity of≽lP ,
z≽lP y≽lP x. (1)
LetQ ⊆ P be the set of agents i ∈ P forwhom zi < α.We argue that
the first |Q | coordinates of x, y and z coincide. Since this is trivial
if Q = ∅, assume Q ≠ ∅. By the definition of Lα , xi = zi < α for
all i ∈ Q , so the first |Q | coordinates of x and z coincide. Assume,
contrary to what we want, that there is an integer k 5 |Q | such
that yk ≠ xk, while yk′ = xk′ for all k′ = 1, . . . , k − 1. Then either
yk > xk implying y≻lP z, or yk < xk implying y≺lP x. Both are in
contradiction with (1).
Since this concludes the proof for Q = P , assume Q ( P . By the
definition of Lα , the last |P \ Q | coordinates of x are all equal to α.
Suppose there is an integer k > |Q | such that yk > xk; then there is
i ∈ P such that yi > α, contradicting y ∈ T . Hence, y 5 x, implying
x≽lP y, and thus by (1), x∼lP y. Since y is the uniquemaximizer in T
w.r.t.≽lP , x = y, as desired. 
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It was argued above that the Leximin solution embodies the
Difference Principle of Rawls (1971), in the sense that it prioritizes
the utilities of those who are worse off over the utilities of those
who are better off. In particular, the Leximin solution outcome is
Hammond equitable (Hammond, 1976): no agent can be made
better off at the expense of a better-off agent—i.e., for P ∈ P and
S ∈ ΣP , if x = L(S), then there is no y ∈ S such that xi < yi < yj <
xj for some i, j ∈ P , and xk = yk for all k ∈ P \ {i, j}. Observation 2.2
reveals that this aspect of the Leximin solution is not driven by
Pareto Optimality: Truncated Leximin solution outcomes too are
Hammond equitable, and thus embody the Difference Principle.6
3. A characterization of T
The aim of this paper is to characterize the class of Truncated
Leximin solutions on the basis of IM, AN, and CONS. It is first proven
in Proposition 3.1 that they indeed satisfy these axioms, then in
Proposition 3.2 that they are the only such solutions.
Proposition 3.1. Truncated Leximin solutions satisfy IM, AN, and
CONS.
Proof. In view of Proposition 2.1, it is easily demonstrated that
Truncated Leximin solutions satisfy IM andAN. Furthermore, CONS
is satisfied by D and L. To see that the latter is true for all Truncated
Leximin solutions, let P,Q ∈ P with P ( Q , let T ∈ ΣQ , and let
S ∈ ΣP with S ≡ tyP (T ) and y ≡ Lα(T ) for some finite α > 0.
By Observation 2.2, Lα(S) = L(S ∧ α) and y = L(T ∧ α). Since
L satisfies CONS, the latter implies L(tyP (T ∧ α)) = yP . Then since
S ∧ α = tyP (T ∧ α), Lα(S) = yP , as desired. 
Proposition 3.2. If a solution satisfies IM, AN, and CONS, then it is a
Truncated Leximin solution.
Throughout the rest of this paper, let ϕ be a solution that
satisfies IM, AN, and CONS. To prove that then ϕ ∈ T we now
first define a particular function f that maps the utopia values
of single-agent problems into their associated solution outcomes.
More precisely, given i ∈ I , let f i be a function onR+with f i(0) ≡ 0
and f i(x) ≡ ϕ(S)where S ∈ Σ i and a(S) = x; since ϕ satisfies AN,
there is a function f on R+ such that f i = f for all i ∈ I .
Lemma 3.3. f satisfies the following properties:
(i) 0 5 f (x) 5 x for all x ∈ R+;
6 Note that Truncated Leximin solutions do not yield the only Hammond
equitable outcomes. However, for any P ∈ P and S ∈ ΣP , if x is not a Truncated
Leximin solution outcome of S, then there is a y ∈ S, an i ∈ P , and a J ⊆ P \ i, such
that xj > yj > yi > xi for all j ∈ J , while xk = yk for all k ∈ P \ (J ∪ i).Fig. 3. There is no x∗ ∈ R+ such that f (x∗) = γ − x∗ .
Fig. 4. If f is not continuous, AN is violated.
(ii) f is non-decreasing;
(iii) f is continuous.
Proof. Observation (i) follows directly from the definition of f . To
see (ii), note that for single-agent problems S and T with a(S) <
a(T ), ϕ(S) 5 ϕ(T ) by IM. Furthermore, for x > 0, f (x) = 0 = f (0)
by (i).
To establish (iii), note first that f is continuous at 0—i.e., for any
ϵ > 0, one can choose δ = ϵ/2 such that |f (x)−f (0)| < ϵ for all x ∈
(0, δ). Thus, assume f has a discontinuity at y > 0. Since f is non-
decreasing by (ii), this is a jump discontinuity—i.e., there exists an
open bounded interval (a, b) ⊆ R+ such that f (x) 5 a for all x < y
and f (x) = b for all x > y (see e.g. Theorem 1 on p. 108 of Royden
and Fitzpatrick, 2010). Consider c ∈ (a, b) with c ≠ f (y), and
define γ ≡ c+y. Then x < y implies f (x) 5 a < c+(y−x) = γ−x,
and x > y implies f (x) = b > c + (y− x) = γ − x. Furthermore, if
x = y, then by the choice of c , f (x) ≠ c + (y− x) = γ − x. Hence,
there is no x∗ ∈ R+ such that f (x∗) = γ − x∗ (see Fig. 3).
Let P ∈ P with |P| = 2, and without loss of generality, assume
P = {1, 2}. Furthermore, let H ∈ ΣP with H = cch{γ e1, γ e2},
and suppose that z ≡ ϕ(H). Consider S ∈ Σ2 with S = tz2(H),
and observe that a(S) = γ − z1. Hence, by CONS, z2 = ϕ2(H) =
ϕ(S) = f (γ − z1). By AN and symmetry of H , z1 = z2, and thus
z1 = f (γ − z1). Defining x∗ ≡ γ − z1, we obtain γ − x∗ = f (x∗),
contradicting the above (see Fig. 4). 
Lemma 3.4. f (x) = min{α, x} for some non-negative, possibly
infinite α.
Proof. Let [a, b] ⊆ R+ be a non-degenerate closed interval on
which f is increasing. It is first demonstrated, by contradiction, that
there exists no y ∈ (a, b) such that f is differentiable in y and
f (y) < y. Thus assume, contrary to what wewant, that there exists
such a y ∈ (a, b). First note that since f is non-decreasing on R+
and increasing on [a, b], f (x) = f (y) if and only if x = y. Further-
more, since f is bounded on [f (y), y+ f (y)] and differentiable in y,
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f (y) < f (y+ h) < f (y)+ λh for all h ∈ (0, f (y)], (2)
f (y) > f (y+ h) > f (y)+ λh for all h ∈ [f (y)− y, 0), (3)
f (y) 5 λ(y− f (y)). (4)
Consider P ∈ P with |P| = 2, and without loss of generality, let
P = {1, 2}. Define S, T ∈ ΣP as
S ≡ cch{(f (y), y), (y, f (y)), (y+ βf (y), 0)}
T ≡ cch{(f (y), y), (y+ βf (y), f (y))}
where β ≡ 1/λ2. Since S ⊆ T and S−i = T−i for i ∈ P , ϕ(S) 5 ϕ(T )
by a two-fold application of IM. We will show next that ϕ2(S) =
f (y) > ϕ2(T ), a contradiction.
Let v ≡ ϕ(S), and assume first that v2 > f (y). By construction
of S, this implies a(tv1 (S)) = y+ f (y)− v2 < y. Then by CONS and
the fact that y ∈ (a, b), v1 = f (a(tv1 (S))) < f (y). By construction
of S, the latter implies a(tv2 (S)) = y, and thus by CONS, v2 = f (y), a
contradiction. Assume next that v2 < f (y). We make two claims:
Claim 1. f (y) < v1 < f (y)+ 1λ (f (y)− v2)
Since v2 ∈ [0, f (y)), it follows by construction of S that
a(tv1 (S)) = y + β(f (y) − v2). Then by CONS, v1 = f (y +
β(f (y) − v2)). Note that β(f (y) − v2) ∈ (0, f (y)]. Then by (2),
f (y) < v1 < f (y)+ λβ(f (y)− v2) = f (y)+ (1/λ)(f (y)− v2).
Claim 2. f (y) > v2 > f (y)+ λ(f (y)− v1)
Since v2 = 0, f (y) < v1 < f (y) + f (y)/λ by the previous argu-
ment. By (4), f (y) + f (y)/λ 5 y; hence, v1 ∈ (f (y), y]. Then by
construction of S, a(tv2 (S)) = y + f (y) − v1, and thus by CONS,
v2 = f (y+ (f (y)− v1)). Note that (f (y)− v1) ∈ [f (y)− y, 0),
so by (3), f (y) > v2 > f (y)+ λ(f (y)− v1).
Putting the two claims together yields
v2 > f (y)+ λ(f (y)− v1)
> f (y)+ λ

f (y)− f (y)− 1
λ
(f (y)− v2)

= v2,
a contradiction. It follows that ϕ2(S) = f (y) (see Fig. 5(a)).
Next consider T , and denote w ≡ ϕ(T ). Assume first that
w1 5 f (y). Then a(tw2 (T )) = y, and thus by CONS, w2 = f (y). But
then a(tw1 (T )) = y+βf (y) > y, which by CONS impliesw1 > f (y),
a contradiction. Hence, w1 > f (y), which by construction of T
implies a(tw2 (T )) < y, and thus by CONS, w2 < f (y). Hence,
ϕ2(T ) < f (y) = ϕ2(S), the desired contradiction (see Fig. 5(b)).
Since f is increasing on (a, b), f is almost everywhere differen-
tiable on (a, b) by Lebesgue’s theorem (e.g., p. 112 of Royden and
Fitzpatrick, 2010). Then by (i) of Lemma 3.3 and the above argu-
ment, f (x) = x almost everywhere on (a, b). If f (z) < z for some
z ∈ [a, b], then by continuity of f there is a δ > 0 such that f (x) < x
for all x in the open interval (z−δ, z+δ)∩(a, b). Since this is in con-
tradictionwith the observation that f (x) = x a.e. on (a, b), f (x) = x
for all x ∈ [a, b]. Since f (x) = x on every closed non-degenerate
interval [a, b] ⊆ R+ on which f is increasing, the lemma follows
by continuity of f . 
Note that Lemma 3.4 establishes Proposition 3.2 for single-
agent problems. Since ϕ satisfies CONS, the value of α in the
definition of f has general implications for which solution is
obtained.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let P ∈ P , S ∈ ΣP , and y ≡ ϕ(S),
and for i ∈ P , let T ∈ Σ i with T ≡ tyi (S). By Lemma 3.4, yi =
min{α, a(T )}, implying y 5 αeP . Hence, if α = 0, then feasibility of
y implies y = 0 = D(S).If α is infinite, then for all i ∈ P , yi = max{zi | z ∈ S and z = y},
that is, y ∈ PO(S). Hence,ϕ satisfies PO, and thus by Proposition 2.1,
ϕ = L.
If 0 < α < ∞, then y ∈ S ∧ α. Furthermore, for all i ∈ P ,
yi = max{zi | z ∈ S ∧ α and z = y}, so that z ∈ PO(S ∧ α).
Then by some trivial modifications of the arguments of Thomson
and Lensberg (1989, p. 133–138), ϕ = Lα . 
Combining Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 leads to the main result of
this paper.
Theorem 3.5. A solution satisfies IM, AN, and CONS, if and only if it
is a Truncated Leximin solution.
We conclude this Section with three corollaries of Theorem 3.5.
First, adding HOM to the axioms of Theorem 3.5 excludes all
solutions from T , except for the Leximin solution and the
Disagreement solution.7
Corollary 3.6. A solution satisfies HOM, IM, AN, and CONS, if and only
if it is either the Disagreement solution or the Leximin solution.
Proof. First note that both the Disagreement solution and the
Leximin solution satisfy HOM, IM, AN, and CONS.
Let ϕ be a solution satisfying these axioms. Then by Theo-
rem 3.5, there is a non-negative and possibly infinite α such that ϕ
is the α-Truncated Leximin solution Lα . Since L0 = D and L∞ = L,
it is sufficient to show that Lα violates HOM in case 0 < α < ∞.
To this end, consider i ∈ I and S ∈ Σ i, and let λ ∈ R++. Since L
satisfies HOM, Lα(λS) = min{α, L(λS)} = min{α, λL(S)}. Further-
more, λLα(S) = min{λα, λL(S)}. If 0 < α < ∞, then by choosing
λ > 1 when α 5 L(S), or λ > α/L(S) when α > L(S), we obtain
λLα(S) = min{λα, λL(S)} > min{α, λL(S)} = Lα(λS). 
The fact that the family of Truncated Leximin solutions is
rather large, and that the inefficient solutions it contains are
not obviously implausible means that based on Thomson and
Lensberg’s characterization result, the Leximin solution may not
be appropriate when efficiency of the outcome of negotiations is
not guaranteed. However, since it ‘‘essentially’’ characterizes the
Leximin solution without relying on PO, Corollary 3.6 to some
extent addresses this concern: it seems questionable that rational,
self-interested agents would unanimously agree on the worst
possible outcome in any situation, so provided that HOM and the
other axioms of Thomson and Lensberg are unproblematic, then
even in environments where efficiency is in doubt, the Leximin
solution outcome is the only plausible outcome of the negotiations.
Implausibility of the Disagreement solution is represented by the
axiom SIR, so adding it to the axioms of Corollary 3.6 leads to an
alternative efficiency-free characterization of the Leximin solution.
Corollary 3.7. A solution satisfies SIR, HOM, IM, AN, and CONS, if and
only if it is the Leximin solution.
Throughout the paper it is assumed that utilities are cardinally
measurable and comparable across agents. There are compelling
arguments in favor of this assumption, but as stated above, this
view is not uncontested. For those who see SI as a minimal
requirement on descriptively interpreted bargaining solutions,
Theorem 3.5 is best framed as the precursor of an impossibility
result: there is no scale invariant solution that satisfies the axioms
IM, AN and CONS, other than the Disagreement solution.
Corollary 3.8. A solution satisfies SI, IM, AN, and CONS, if and only if
it is the Disagreement solution.
7 Note that this also follows from Proposition 6 of Lensberg and Thomson (1988)
and the characterization of L. In particular, Lensberg and Thomson (1988) show
that a solution satisfying HOM, AN and CONS must either be the Disagreement
solution, or satisfy PO; if IM is added to these axioms, then the solution is either
the Disagreement solution, or it satisfies the characterizing axioms of the Leximin
solution.
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4.1. Truncated Egalitarian solutions
Given P ∈ P and S ∈ ΣP , the Egalitarian solution is defined
as E(S) ≡ α∗eP where α∗ is the maximal α such that αeP ∈ S. The
Egalitarian solution is characterized as follows.
Proposition 4.1 (Thomson (1983)). A solution satisfies WPO, SY, IIA,
MON, and CONT if and only if it is the Egalitarian solution.
Thomson (1984) defined a class of solutions akin to those
considered in this paper. Given a list α ≡ {αP | P ∈ P } of non-
negative and possibly infinite real numbers with the property that
P ( Q implies αP = αQ , the associated Truncated Egalitarian
solution Eα is defined as follows: for all P ∈ P and S ∈ ΣP ,
Eα(S) ≡ E(S) ∧ αP . It is clear that these solutions satisfy all the
axiomsof Proposition 4.1 except forWPO.However, there are other
such solutions, i.e., the axioms SY, IIA, MON, and CONT also admit
solutions that allow for limited substitutability of utility in the case
of two-player problems.
Proposition 4.2 (Thomson (1984)). A solution ϕ satisfies SY, IIA,
MON, and CONT if and only if
(i) it coincides with a Truncated Egalitarian solution Eα except
perhaps when |P| = 2 on the subclass ΣPα of problems S such
that αPeP = E(S) = αeP where α ≡ sup{αP∪i | i ∈ I \ P};
(ii) for each P ∈ P with |P| = 2, it coincides onΣPα with a solution ϕ˜
satisfying SY, IIA, and CONT such that ϕ˜(S) = αeP for all S ∈ ΣPα ;
and
(iii) for all i ∈ I , αi = sup{ϕi(S) | P = {i, j}, j ∈ I \ i, S ∈ ΣP}.
In contrast, removing PO from Thomson and Lensberg’s (1989)
axiom set does not give rise to any other solutions than the
Truncated Leximin solutions. An explanation for this difference is
already partially provided by Thomson and Lensberg (1989, p. 66)
in their discussion of Proposition 4.2: any utility substitution in the
two-player case would be ruled out as soon as for all P ∈ P with
|P| = 2, αP = α. This feature arises naturally from the axioms of
Theorem 3.5: since they include CONS, the utility level α at which
the solution outcome is truncated in single-agent problems, must
also be the cut-off value in problems that involve multiple agents.
A further implication of Proposition 4.2 is that the role of WPO
in Thomson’s (1983) characterization of the Egalitarian solution
is larger than that of PO in Thomson and Lensberg’s (1989)
characterization of the Leximin solution. However, a result similar
to Corollary 3.7 can be obtained: when SIR and HOM are added to
the axioms of Proposition 4.2, then the Egalitarian solution is the
only one that remains admissible (See Thomson, 1984, p. 31).4.2. Solutions of a proportional character
On the basis of Kalai’s (1977) Proportional solutions, Roth
(1979b) defined a class of solutions similar to Truncated Egalitarian
solutions, and thus in the domain Σ˜ of strictly comprehensive
problems (i.e. problems S ∈ Σ with WPO(S) = PO(S)), also to
Truncated Leximin solutions. Given P ∈ P , S ∈ ΣP and q ∈ RP++, a
q-Proportional solution is given by the maximal point in S that is
proportional to q, i.e. F q(S) ≡ α∗q where α∗ ≡ max{α | αq ∈
S}; the family of all such solutions, that is, for all P ∈ P and
q ∈ RP++, is referred to as the family of Proportional solutions.
A solution of a proportional character is obtained by rescaling a
Proportional solution outcome by a possibly problem-dependent
factor β(S) ∈ [0, 1]. Both Truncated Egalitarian solutions and
solutions of a proportional character violate WPO. However, as
pointed out by Thomson (1984) there is a marked difference
between the two in how this axiom is violated: Roth’s solutions
always violate it whenβ(S) < 1. This violation stands, irrespective
of any inflation of the problem, i.e., if S is inflated by a factor λ > 0
then WPO remains violated as long as β(λS) < 1. On the other
hand, a Truncated Egalitarian solution outcome coincides with
the symmetric Proportional (i.e., the Egalitarian) solution when
the problem is small enough, but as the problem is inflated, the
solution outcome is capped at a given utility level.
Similar to Roth’s modification of the Proportional solutions,
one may also define proportional versions of the Leximin solution.
Specifically, given a (constant) β ∈ [0, 1], P ∈ P , and S ∈ ΣP , the
β-Proportional Leximin solution PLβ is defined as PLβ ≡ βL(S).
Clearly, such solutions violate PO (at least for β < 1). However,
while satisfying AN and IM, they also violate CONS, as illustrated
by the following example.
Let P ∈ P with |P| = 2, and without loss of generality assume
P = {1, 2}. Define H ≡ cch{e1, e2}, and note that H ∈ ΣP . Then
z ≡ PL1/2(H) = (1/4, 1/4). However, since a(tz2(H)) = 3/4,
TL1/2(tz2(H)) = 3/8 ≠ z2.
4.3. The Nash solution
For all P ∈ P and for all S ∈ ΣP , theNash solution (Nash, 1950)
is defined as the unique outcome thatmaximizes the product of the
agents’ utilities, i.e. N(S) ≡ argmaxz∈Si∈P zi. Following are two
prominent characterizations.
Proposition 4.3. The Nash solution is the only solution that satisfies
(i) PO, SY, SI, and IIA (Nash, 1950);
(ii) PO, AN, SI, and CONS (Lensberg, 1988).
Both characterizations rely on PO, which, as argued above, may not
be appropriate when bargaining problems are given a descriptive
interpretation. Roth (1979a) therefore studied its role in Nash’s
characterization, and Lensberg and Thomson (1988) studied it in
Lensberg’s. They reached a similar answer.
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are the only solutions that satisfy
(i) SY, SI, and IIA (Roth, 1979a);
(ii) AN, SI, and CONS (Lensberg and Thomson, 1988).
The results of Proposition 4.4 are similar to Corollary 3.7: when
omitting PO from Nash’s and Lensberg’s respective axiom sets,
the only inefficient solution that emerges is the Disagreement
solution. The reason why this robustness result is in this case
obtained without explicitly adding HOM is that HOM is implied
by SI. Similar to Corollary 3.7, adding SIR to the axiom sets of
Proposition 4.4 eliminates the Disagreement solution, and thus
leads to two efficiency-free characterizations of the Nash solution.
5. Concluding remarks
Although PO is not free of criticism, the purpose of this
paper is not to posit Truncated Leximin solutions as preferable
alternatives to the Leximin solution, or other solutions in the
literature. Indeed, the position that Truncated Leximin solutions
have some advantage over other known solutions would be hard
to defend. The main aim is rather to investigate to what extent
PO contributes to Thomson and Lensberg’s (1989) characterization
of the Leximin solution. In the first place, it is revealed that
removing PO from Thomson and Lensberg’s axiom set does not
compromise the distinguishing feature of the Leximin solution that
the utilities of those who are worse off are given priority over the
utilities of those who are best off. More precisely, even without
PO, the remaining axioms ensure that any feasible outcome x is
disqualified as a potential agreement if it features an inequality
– i.e. agents i and j with xj > xi – that could feasibly be
resolved or diminished by reducing xj and increasing xi (Hammond,
1976). A second, more negative conclusion is that PO plays an
important role in this characterization, in the sense that it rules out
a large number of non-trivial inefficient solutions. This means that
short of alternative efficiency-free characterizations, the Leximin
solution may not be entirely appropriate when the bargaining
problem represents a situation in which efficiency cannot be
guaranteed.8 Fortunately, Corollary 3.8 does provide such an
alternative characterization. In particular, if instead of removing PO
from Thomson and Lensberg’s axiom set, it is replacedwith SIR and
HOM, then the only admissible solution is the Leximin solution.
The immediate question that then arises is whether SIR and
HOM are really uncontroversial. Arguably, this is the case for SIR.
After all, in which situations would the behavior of rational bar-
gainers be accurately represented by the Disagreement solution?
HOM on the other hand, could be more problematic. As stated
above, the proper interpretation of utilities in our environment is
that they are cardinallymeasurable and comparable across agents;
then HOM essentially says that agents always behave in the same
way, regardless of how much is at stake. Much like PO, this is a
requirement that might not hold in all situations. The question
whether there are unproblematic axioms that could replace PO in
Thomson and Lensberg’s axiom set while still characterizing L, can
be answered by careful examination of our results. In particular,
any such axiom would only have to rule out the existence of non-
trivial intervals onwhich f is constant. The followingwould be one
example.
Responsiveness to Non-trivial Inflation (RNI): For all P ∈ P ,
for all λ > 0, and for all S, T ∈ ΣP with T = λS, if ϕ(S) = ϕ(T )
then λ = 1.
8 Note that the characterizations of Imai (1983), Chun and Peters (1989), Nieto
(1992), and of Chen (2000) all make use of PO.RNI says that if a bargaining problem is non-trivially inflated –
i.e. inflated by a factor λ different from one – then this should have
an effect on the solution outcome. In other words, an inflation of
the problem changes the bargaining attitudes of the agents. While
to the best of my knowledge, this axiom has not appeared in the
literature, it isworth pointing out that it fits into the class of axioms
that Thomson (2010) refers to as relational axioms pertaining to
the feasible set. Furthermore, RNI is implied both by PO, and by
the combination of SIR and HOM.
While some may impugn the plausibility of HOM as a
descriptive axiom, theremaybe otherswho are equally troubled by
its absence. In particular, thosewho do not believe in interpersonal
utility comparisons see the stronger axiom SI as a minimal
requirement for bargaining solutions, and the introduction of HOM
as a partial remedy against this omission of SI. Since the Leximin
solution does not satisfy SI, thosewho hold this viewmay interpret
Theorem 3.5 as a negative result: The only scale invariant solution
that satisfies IM, AN, and CONS, is the (implausible) Disagreement
solution (see Corollary 3.8).
We will conclude with a remark on how Truncated Leximin so-
lutions violate HOM. As mentioned above, HOM could be inter-
preted as a type of time-consistency: if bargainers exponentially
discount utilities with factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and S ∈ Σ is attainable at
time t + 1, then bargaining at time t over the utilities feasible at
time t + 1 (i.e., ϕ(δS)) yields the same time-t outcome as bargain-
ing at time t+1 and discounting the solution outcome (i.e., δϕ(S)).
Suppose now that agents bargain with some reference point in
mind, someutility level they expect or aspire to realize by engaging
in the bargaining process. If their time-(t+ 1) reference point is α,
then the corresponding time-t reference point is δα. Then we may
still require that bargaining at time t over the utilities feasible at
time t + 1 (i.e., ϕ(δS, δα)) yields the same time-t outcome as bar-
gaining at time t + 1 and discounting back (i.e., δϕ(S, α)).9 While
Truncated Leximin solutions violate HOM, they do satisfy this type
of time-consistency. In particular, Lδα(δS) = δLα(S). Note that for
Lα to satisfy HOM, it is required that α = δα, a condition that only
holds if either α = 0 or α = ∞, i.e. respectively the conditions
under which Lα = D and Lα = L.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.07.003.
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